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standpoint, Bernanke et al. (1999) describe IT as a
“framework” rather than as a rule. In a similar vein,
Gavin (2004), characterizes IT as “management by
objective,” rather than as a well-defined policy rule.
On the other end of the spectrum, Svensson (1999)
defines IT as a monetary policy rule derived from an
explicit optimization problem. Much of the difficulty
in defining IT is due to its humble origins in central
banking practice, and policymakers’ pragmatic
search for a suitable nominal anchor. Svensson’s
definition can therefore be seen as part of a broader
effort to retrofit macroeconomic theory to a policy
that was developed largely in the absence of a formal
theoretical framework.2
Clearly, neither polar view can adequately
characterize IT as it is actually practiced. For IT as a
“framework” or a “management objective” to make
any difference to macroeconomic outcomes, it must
translate into some sort of change in central bank
behavior. And this change, in turn, should have
implications for the empirical policy rule used to
describe policymakers’ behavior. Similarly, surely
no central bank sees itself as an automaton mechan-
ically implementing a policy rule. The goal of this
paper is therefore to determine where central bank-
ing practice lies on the “guidelines versus rules”
spectrum and, specifically, to assess empirically
the extent to which IT can be described in terms of
simple monetary policy rules.
The task of characterizing IT in terms of a policy
rule is complicated both by conflicting definitions
of the term “policy rule” and by differing interpre-
tations of what IT entails in practice, however. In an
attempt to clarify what is meant by the term, section 2
2 As Goldfeld (1984) quipped in a different context, “An economist is
someone who sees something working in practice and asks whether
it would work in principle.”
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No rule is so general, which admits not some
exception.
—Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy
1. INTRODUCTION
M
ore than 13 years have elapsed since the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s pioneering
introduction of a formal inflation target
in 1990, a framework subsequently adopted by at
least 21 other central banks. Collectively, these 22
countries represent more than 132 country-years
of experience with inflation targeting (IT).1 This
accumulation of experience has led to a growing
understanding of the practical and institutional
features of the policy; see, for example, Bernanke
et al. (1999), Sterne (2002), Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel (2002), and Truman (2003). Roughly in
parallel with central banks’ embrace of IT, there
has been an explosion of research on monetary
policy rules—spawned in no small part by Taylor’s
(1993) influential paper. This line of research has
blossomed in recent years, especially with the
theoretical contributions of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(1999), Svensson (2003), Woodford (2003), and
Giannoni and Woodford (2003a,b) on optimal policy
rules, to name just a few.
Given these parallel developments in central
banking practice and monetary theory, it is no sur-
prise that a great deal of recent research has modeled
IT as some sort of a monetary policy rule. Views differ
on the usefulness of describing IT in these terms,
however. Coming at the question from a practical
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1 An annotated listing of inflation targeters can be found in Mishkin
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). A similar list of inflation targeters appears
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Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
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reviews the various definitions of “policy rule.”
Section 3 describes how IT is implemented and how
this practice might be mapped into the sorts of rules
summarized in the preceding section. Section 4 then
characterizes the behavior of major IT central banks
econometrically, with the various interpretations
of “policy rule” as a guide. The novel feature of our
empirical analysis is the use of central banks’ own
inflation and output forecasts, exploiting the over-
lapping nature of these forecasts in order to estimate
the response of policy to new information. Section 5
concludes.
2. POLICY RULES: A GUIDE FOR THE
PERPLEXED
The explosion in research on monetary policy
rules has resulted in a proliferation of definitions
of the term “policy rule.” This has, not surprisingly,
led to some confusion in the literature, and discus-
sions of the topic often flounder on issues of termi-
nology. Naturally, the answer to the question of
whether IT can be described by a policy rule will
depend a great deal on what exactly is meant by
the term.3 This section provides a brief review of
some of the alternative definitions in an effort to
clarify some of these issues. 
Conditional Versus Unconditional Rules
The easiest rules to enforce, of course, are simple
ones. And in the context of monetary policy rules,
the simplest sort of rule would be something like the
fixed money supply rule analyzed in Rogoff (1985)
and King (1997). Such a “non-contingent” or uncon-
ditional rule represents an inflexible commitment
to a nominal anchor and obviously prohibits any
sort of response to economic conditions. In certain
models, this kind of inflexibility can result from
assigning a zero weight to output fluctuations in the
central bank’s loss function, a case King (1997) refers
to as that of the “inflation nutter.” Such a rule would,
by construction, not allow the central bank to (opti-
mally) offset the effects of supply shocks on output.
And as pointed out by Rogoff (1985), such a rule
would also prevent the central bank from accommo-
dating nominal money demand shocks, potentially
introducing more volatility in output and inflation.
It is this sort of inflexible rule that was criticized by
Friedman and Kuttner (1996), among others. Recent
research has deemphasized these unconditional
policy rules, however, and the focus now is much
more on the design of flexible, conditional rules that
allow the policymaker to respond in a reasonable
(or even optimal) manner to economic conditions.
Ad Hoc Versus Optimal Rules
Among those “state contingent” rules that allow
policy to respond to economic conditions, a broad
distinction can be drawn between ad hoc policy rules
relating the policy instrument to some selection of
macroeconomic variables and those rules derived
from an explicit optimization problem. Taylor’s
(1993) eponymous rule
(1) it=r*+π*+0.5 xt+1.5(πt – π*) 
is of course the best-known example of the former;
here, it is the nominal policy interest rate, r* is the
equilibrium real rate of interest, π* is the desired
or “target” level of inflation, πt is the current rate
of inflation, and xt is the output gap.4 Another
example is the inflation forecast–based (IFB) rule
proposed by Batini and Haldane (1999), in which
the nominal interest rate depends on a distributed
lead of τ-period-ahead inflation forecasts made at
time t, πt+τ,t (ignoring interest rate smoothing for
simplicity):
(2) .
By contrast, rules based on an explicit optimiza-
tion problem are almost invariably based on setting
policy in such a way as to minimize a loss function
of the form
(3) .
The optimal response of the interest rate derived
from (3) will in general not be given by (1) or (2),
although it is often possible to reverse-engineer
objective functions that would rationalize such rules.
Nonetheless, these sorts of rules tend to produce
reasonable (if not optimal) policy responses, provided
the sum of the inflation coefficients exceeds unity,
thus satisfying the Taylor principle. This observation
has led to a vast literature comparing the perform-
ance of simple ad hoc rules, like Taylor’s, with the
optimal policy response for a variety of models. See,
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4 To make the rule operational, Taylor used the current year-over-year
inflation rate for πt and linearly detrended output for xt.
3 Bofinger (2000) also grapples with the problem of mapping IT into
alternative definitions of a policy rule.
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for example, Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and
Williams (2003). 
Targeting Versus Instrument Rules
Probably the most familiar way to characterize
the conduct of monetary policy is in terms of an
instrument rule involving the policy instrument
itself. Equations (1) and (2) are examples in which
the nominal interest rate is the policy instrument.
Although these examples are ad hoc rules, it would
also be possible to insert the relevant structural
relationships into the first-order condition from mini-
mizing (3) to yield the optimal instrument rule for
a particular model. A distinction is also sometimes
made between explicit instrument rules involving
predetermined macro variables (i.e., ones that do not
depend on the current setting of the policy instru-
ment) and implicit rules whose arguments are jointly
determined with the policy instrument (as would
typically be the case if the rule’s arguments included
forecasts). An explicit rule can be interpreted as a
simple “recipe” for policy, while implementing an
implicit rule (such as the IFB) requires that the policy-
maker account for the feedback between the instru-
ment and the arguments of the rule.
A less familiar way to characterize policy is
directly in terms of the targeted variables themselves,
yielding what is referred to as a targeting rule. An
optimal targeting rule could either take the form of
simply pledging to minimize (3) (a “general” targeting
rule in Svensson’s terminology) or setting policy in
such a way as to satisfy the first-order conditions
from (3) describing the marginal trade-off facing the
policymaker between output and inflation stabiliza-
tion (a “specific” targeting rule). With a quadratic
objective function, the first-order conditions imply
a linear marginal trade-off between inflation and
the output gap, such as those discussed in section
4. There are also ad hoc targeting rules involving
only the central bank’s goal variables, but which
are not explicitly derived from an optimization
problem. A prescription to achieve the desired
inflation rate at a fixed horizon could be classified
as a targeting rule of this type.
Because instrument rules can be derived from
targeting rules (and vice versa), the distinction
between the two is at some level artificial. The dis-
tinction is further blurred when a term involving
the change in the interest rate is included in the
objective function, presumably reflecting a prefer-
ence for interest rate smoothing as in Giannoni and
Woodford (2003a,b). In this case, the policy instru-
ment would appear in the first-order condition,
making the targeting rule indistinguishable from
an implicit instrument rule.
Nonetheless, Svensson (2003) contends that
formulating policy in terms of a targeting rule has
several compelling advantages over an instrument
rule. Chief among these is that targeting rules can
more readily accommodate central bankers’ “judg-
ment” regarding special factors affecting inflation
and output (macro models’ ubiquitous “add factors”),
as well as any unusual circumstances affecting the
efficacy of the monetary transmission mechanism.
Svensson shows that variables representing policy-
makers’ judgment will typically enter the instrument
rule formulation, rendering the implementation of
policy by that route more complex and less intelli-
gible. By contrast, these judgment variables do not
appear in targeting rules. Intuitively, this is because
the targeting rule embodies the central bank’s imper-
ative simply to do whatever it takes to achieve the
appropriate balance between output and inflation
stabilization, incorporating any judgment that might
be appropriate in selecting the instrument setting
needed to achieve the desired objective.
Rules Describing Discretion Outcomes
Versus Rules Derived from a
Commitment
Contributing to the terminological haze is the
fact that the term “policy rule” has been used to
describe both the outcome of discretionary policy
setting (i.e., re-optimizing each period) and a con-
dition that commits the central bank to potentially
time-inconsistent actions in the future. In fact, as
shown by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), a Taylor-
like instrument rule can be derived as the optimal
instrument rule for a central bank acting under
discretion. This observation means it is difficult to
discern in practice whether a central bank has acted
in a purely discretionary fashion or tempered that
discretion with some sort of commitment. Merely
finding that monetary policy is well-described econo-
metrically by a simple policy rule like Taylor’s
therefore does not necessarily imply any sort of
commitment. This is not to say that optimal policy
rules derived under discretion are the same as those
derived under precommitment. Indeed, a generic
feature of the latter is some degree of “history
dependence”—i.e., for the policy response to depend
not only on the current state of the economy, but
the lagged state of the economy as well (typically,
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the lagged output gap).5 As a practical matter, how-
ever, it may be difficult to detect this sort of behavior,
especially in the presence of an interest rate smooth-
ing objective.
Mechanical Rules Versus Rules as
“Guidelines”
Related to the discretion-versus-commitment
dimension is the distinction between a rule that func-
tions as a strict prescription for policy actions, versus
one that serves as a looser “guideline” or “frame-
work” for the conduct of monetary policy. This
distinction has a long history. Simons (1936), for
instance, interpreted a policy rule as completely
precluding any intervention on the part of the
“authorities.” “Monetary rules,” Simons wrote,
“must be compatible with the reasonably smooth
working of the system. Once established, however,
they should work mechanically, with the chips
falling where they may” (Simons, 1936, pp. 13-14).
Clearly, it is this strict, mechanical interpretation
that Bernanke et al. (1999) object to as a characteri-
zation of IT.6
It is also apparent that this is not what Taylor
had in mind when he proposed his rule. “Policy
rules are frequently written down in the form of a
‘mechanical-looking’ algebraic formula…But this
does not mean that the only way that monetary
policy rules can be used is for the central bank to
follow them mechanically,” Taylor wrote. “On the
contrary, most recent proposals for monetary policy
rules assume that they would be used as guidelines
for policymakers, recognizing the need for some
discretion in using the rule” (Taylor, 2000, p. 209).
Svensson’s interpretation of a rule appears to
be closer to that of Simon’s than to Taylor’s. He finds
Taylor’s looser interpretation of a rule “not suffi-
ciently specific to be operational” on the grounds
that “there are no rules for when deviations from
the instrument rule are appropriate,” which, he
argues, creates an “inherent lack of transparency”
(Svensson, 2003, p. 445). But Svensson does allow
discretion to enter through the arguments of the
policy rules: e.g., via judgmental adjustments to
forecasts or the policymakers’ assessment of the
policy setting required to attain the optimal outcome.
3. WHAT DOES INFLATION TARGETING
HAVE TO DO WITH POLICY RULES?
The goal of this section is to make a connection
between the various definitions of a policy rule dis-
cussed above and IT as it is actually practiced. To
that end, it first outlines three ways in which IT could
be interpreted within the context of monetary macro
models. Second, it summarizes the key features of IT
as it is practiced by self-described inflation targeters.
The section concludes by highlighting dimensions
along which the practice of IT does (or does not) map
into the theoretical characterizations of IT.
A Theoretical Taxonomy
Perhaps the weakest definition of IT is having
some desired rate of inflation, π*, (which need not
be announced) and employing a reaction function
or instrument rule that satisfies the “Taylor principle”
of a greater-than one-for-one response to expected
inflation, thus ensuring that eventually inflation
returns to π*. The reaction function may of course
also include a response to the output gap. This could
be called “weak form” IT. The reaction function need
not be optimal, in the sense of being derived from
an explicit loss minimization problem. Under this
definition, even following a simple ad hoc Taylor-
style rule will work. Galí (2002) and McCallum
(2002), among others, define IT in this way.
A stronger definition of IT (“semi-strong form IT”)
restricts membership in the club to those central
banks following an optimal monetary policy, i.e.,
setting policy in such a way as to minimize a rela-
tively explicit loss function like (1) above. This is the
definition in Svensson (1999).7 This optimization
need not be carried out subject to any sort of pre-
commitment, however. Indeed, the optimal instru-
ment rule derived under the assumption of
discretionary, period-by-period optimization in
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) is described as a
rule that characterizes IT.
The strongest conceptual definition of IT
(“strong-form IT”) is in terms of optimal monetary
policy under conditions of precommitment (or alter-
7 Svensson’s (1999) definition goes even farther, defining IT narrowly
as an optimal targeting rule, although it is not clear why optimal policy
could not also be implemented with an instrument rule.
5 Confusing matters still further: Considering only rules that depend
on the current state of the economy, the optimal instrument rule
under commitment is the same as that obtained under discretion
with a smaller weight on output in the loss function (λ). See Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler (1999).
6 Even while arguing that a monetary rule should be mechanical,
Simons (1936) recognized that an unconditional rule, such as a fixed
supply of money, would probably be too inflexible.
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natively the “timeless” perspective). The optimal
policy rule derived under these assumptions involves
a commitment to a time-inconsistent course of future
action on the part of the central bank: e.g., reducing
inflation today by the promise to run negative out-
put gaps in the future.8 Svensson (1999) seems to be
agnostic as to whether IT necessarily involves such
a precommitment, although he argues that IT can,
at least, help reduce or eliminate any inflation bias
resulting from an above-equilibrium output target.
The precommitment solution is clearly what King
(1997) had in mind in his description of IT, however,
and this is also apparently the view of Giannoni
and Woodford (2003c).9
Inflation Targeting in Practice
Although the practice of IT is anything but uni-
form across countries, a number of elements are
common to most self-declared inflation targeters.
These include10
• An emphasis on long-run price stability as
the principal goal of monetary policy: This
is not to say that price stability is the only
goal, however—only that other objectives
can be pursued only to the extent that they
are compatible with the inflation target.11
• An explicit numerical target for inflation and
a timetable for reaching that target: Most are
in the neighborhood of 2 percent, and all aim
to achieve the target at a horizon of no more
than two years.
• A high degree of transparency with regard to
monetary policy formulation: Most inflation
targeters publish a detailed report on general
economic conditions and the outlook for
inflation in particular, typically at a quarterly
frequency. In some cases, these reports
include numerical projections of key macro-
economic variables.
• A mechanism for accountability: Besides
promoting transparency, the central banks’
published inflation reports also provide a
means for ex post evaluation of inflation
performance. Failure to fulfill the inflation
target may require the central bank to take
specific steps. For example, should inflation
deviate by more than 1 percentage point from
its 2.5 percent target, the Governor of the Bank
of England is obliged to submit an open letter
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer explaining
the reason for the deviation and presenting
a timetable for a return to the target.
Although most inflation targeters share these
four broad features, there is considerable variation
in some of the specifics. At the level of implementa-
tion, for example, central banks differ with respect
to choice of price index (overall versus “core” infla-
tion) and the particular form of the target (point
versus range). At a more substantive level, inflation
targeters also differ as to “goal independence”: those
that are only “instrument independent” pursue a
target set for them by the elected government, while
those that are also “goal independent” set their own
targets. There is also a great deal of heterogeneity
with respect to exactly what central banks commu-
nicate—and how; these differences are cataloged
in great detail by Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz
(2003).
It is also interesting to distinguish full-fledged
inflation targeters from “near-inflation targeters”
on the basis of these features. For example, some
central banks—particularly those of emerging-
market or post-communist countries—have set up
most of the mechanics of IT, but lack the institu-
tional means to make a long-run commitment to
price stability. Carare and Stone (2003) and Stone
(2003) refer to this regime as “Inflation Targeting
Lite.” Other central banks seem to have internalized
the price stability objective without adopting all the
trappings of outright IT. The Federal Reserve might
be put into this category. Although it also operates
under a dual mandate, in recent years price stability
has been increasingly emphasized as the primary
long-run goal of monetary policy.12 Nonetheless,
the Federal Reserve still lacks an explicit numerical
inflation target, and as discussed in Kuttner and
Posen (2001), its monetary policy formulation
12 In 1988, Greenspan stated: “We should not be satisfied unless the U.S.
economy is operating at high employment with a sustainable external
position and above all stable prices...By price stability, I mean a situation
in which households and businesses in making their saving and invest-
ment decisions can safely ignore the possibility of sustained, generalized
price increases or decreases” [Greenspan (1988), emphasis added].
8 Or, in the case of Japan, increasing inflation today by the promise of
running positive output gaps in the future, as in Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003).
9 Oddly, the empirical application in Giannoni and Woodford (2003c)
is to the Federal Reserve, which is generally not considered a full-
fledged inflation targeter.
10 A similar list of features is given in Truman (2003).
11 Debelle (2003) points out that Australia is something of an exception
in this regard, in that the Reserve Bank of Australia operates under a
dual mandate of price stability and full employment.
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remains considerably more opaque than that of the
typical inflation targeter.13
Will the Real Inflation Targeter Please
Step Forward?
The question now is how (and indeed whether)
the central bank practices described above map into
the various definitions of IT that have been proposed
in the theoretical literature. Based on the institutional
arrangements, which central banks qualify for
membership in the IT club? And to what extent
does this depend on the theoretical definition of IT
one has in mind?
“Weak form” IT is so weak as to be almost vacu-
ous. Under this definition, virtually every major
central bank qualifies as an inflation targeter. It
implies merely that the central bank acts in such a
way as to eventually bring inflation back to its target,
and says nothing about the nature of the policy used
to get there. Thus, it would seem that the only
requirement for entry into the IT club is having a
reaction function coefficient of at least a certain size.
And indeed since this condition is also a require-
ment for a well-behaved solution to conventional
macro models, any country with a mean-reverting
inflation rate would ipso facto qualify as an inflation
targeter; only those with “unstable” inflation would
fail the test.14
It is hard to find institutional evidence that any
central bank conforms to either the “strong” or
“semi-strong” forms of IT. The problem is that no
central bank—inflation targeter or otherwise—
currently conducts policy with reference to an
explicit, publicly announced loss function or first-
order condition. Nor is there any documentary evi-
dence to suggest that policymakers choose between
different policy options on the basis of any numeri-
cal estimate of the estimated “loss” associated with
the various options. Thus, on the basis of Svensson’s
definition of IT as an optimal targeting rule, it would
seem that no central bank qualifies as a bona fide
inflation targeter.15 Furthermore, even among self-
proclaimed inflation targeters, only the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) publishes a forecast
of the output gap, which is a key ingredient in con-
ventional targeting rules.16
While no inflation targeter currently communi-
cates in the language of optimization, all inflation
targeters talk a great deal. Indeed, as noted above,
communication is a central element of the practice
of IT. Formalizing the role of this IT-induced trans-
parency has presented a theoretical challenge, how-
ever. From an optimal control standpoint, it makes
no difference whether the central bank keeps its
first-order conditions to itself or explains them in
detail to the public four times per year. Optimal
policy will be the same either way.
One hypothesis is that transparency and
accountability somehow allow the central bank to
overcome the time consistency problem inherent
in optimal monetary policy. One way to formalize
this idea is to assume private information on the part
of the central bank regarding its output or inflation
objectives. Herrendorf (1998) and Faust and Svensson
(2001) take this approach, as does Geraats (2002),
explicitly in the context of the decision to publish
a forecast. In Drazen and Masson (1994) and Agénor
and Masson (1999), the private information has to
do with the central bank’s preferences: specifically,
whether it is “strong” in the sense of assigning a low
weight on output fluctuations in its loss function
relative to a “weak” central bank. In the context of
both sets of models, transparency plays a direct role
in helping to reveal the unobserved private infor-
mation. Less formally, King (1997) has argued that
transparency, accountability, and a clearly defined
objective all enhance central bank “credibility,”
defined as the ability to convince the private sector
that it will carry out policies that may be time incon-
sistent, and thus implement the optimal state-
contingent rule. 
4. ESTIMATED POLICY RULES FOR
THREE INFLATION TARGETERS AND
THE FED
We now turn to the question of how well the
behavior of IT central banks can be characterized
by simple policy rules of the sort discussed earlier
in section 2. We first consider conventional instru-
ment rules relating the relevant short-term interest
16 Svensson (2000) contends this is an essential requirement for IT:
“policy decisions are consistently motivated with reference to pub-
lished inflation and output(-gap) forecasts.”
13 It is worth making a distinction between transparency in policy formu-
lation versus transparency in implementation. The Federal Reserve has,
of course, become much more transparent in the implementation of
policy, especially since the practice of announcing changes in the
funds rate target began in February 1994.
14 In backward-looking models, failing to satisfy the Taylor principle
typically results in explosive inflation; in forward-looking models, it
can generate indeterminacies.
15 In the spirit of Friedman (1953), it might be argued that central bankers
act “as if” they were minimizing a loss function, even if they were not
consciously aware that fact.
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rate to macroeconomic objectives, i.e., output and
inflation. Specific targeting rules—that is, equations
describing the optimal trade-off between output
and inflation—are taken up later in the section. 
Ideally, one would want to use these estimates
to say which of the definitions of IT from section 3
best described the central banks’ behavior. This is
hard to do econometrically, unfortunately. Estimates
of instrument rules or reaction functions may reveal
something about whether the Taylor principle is sat-
isfied, but without a fully and correctly specified
macro model, it is difficult (if not impossible) to dis-
tinguish between optimal and ad hoc behavior on
the part of the central bank. Similarly, the distinction
between discretionary and precommitment-based
policy is a very subtle one to discern empirically,
although Kuttner and Posen (1999) suggest that
precommitment-like behavior may explain the
observed decline in inflation persistence among
inflation targeters. At the very least, however, such
estimates can provide some information as to how
closely banks’ behavior conforms to simple rules
of one form or another.
This is, of course, not the first effort to describe
central banks’ behavior in terms of simple policy
rules. What distinguishes this paper from much of
the other work in the area is its use of the central
banks’ own published inflation and output forecasts,
rather than econometric proxies for the relevant
expectations.17 This approach has a number of
compelling advantages. First, it greatly simplifies
the econometrics, reducing the data requirements
and obviating the need for the two-stage GMM
method used by Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000).
Second, the central banks’ own forecasts are likely
to be more reliable than those based on simple
econometric methods.18 One reason is that the
central banks’ forecasts undoubtedly incorporate
a great deal of information not in the macro time
series, as well as informal “judgment” as to the most
likely outcomes. It is this kind of an information
advantage that Romer and Romer (2000) suggest
accounts for the superior performance of the Federal
Reserve’s Green Book forecasts. Finally, the published
forecasts presumably embody appropriate assump-
tions about the central banks’ intended policy
actions. Naive, unconditional econometric forecasts,
on the other hand, may imply a path of policy at
odds with central banks’ intentions. 
The analysis in this section focuses on three
central banks: the RBNZ, the Bank of England, and
Sweden’s Riksbank. These three were chosen
because they are the three inflation targeters with
the longest track record of published, quantitative
forecasts. Other seasoned inflation targeters, such
as the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of
Canada, make use of detailed projections internally,
but these projections have not been made available
publicly. Instead, their published reports contain
only more qualitative, impressionistic assessments
of the outlook for inflation and output, which are
less amenable to quantitative analysis.
Although all three of the central banks under
study report some sort of a forecast every quarter,
the nature of these forecasts differs considerably
across banks. Since 1997, the Bank of England’s
Inflation Report has consistently reported projections
for four-quarter inflation and real gross domestic
product (GDP) growth (mean, median, mode, and a
measure of uncertainty) for an eight-quarter forecast
horizon. The Riksbank, since 1992, has published
forecasts for Q4/Q4 real GDP growth and December/
December consumer price index (CPI) inflation for
the current year and the two following “out” years.
The RBNZ reports projections over a longer forecast
horizon than the other central banks, with some
forecasts going out as long as 15 quarters. The RBNZ
is also unique in that it is the only central bank ever
to have published estimates and forecasts of the
output gap—a key ingredient in typical targeting
and instrument rules.
The three central banks do differ somewhat as
to how they express their inflation targets. Over the
period covered by the analysis in this paper, the
Bank of England had a point target of 2.5 percent
for the retail price index less mortgage-related items
(known as the RPIX). The RBNZ’s current Policy
Targets Agreement (PTA) currently specifies a 1 to 3
percent range for overall CPI inflation. (From 1997
through 2002:Q3, the target range was 0 to 3 percent
for core CPIX inflation.) The Sveriges Riksbank has
a point target of 2 percent for overall CPI inflation,
with a ±1 percent tolerance around that target.
17 Jansson and Vredin (2003) and Berg, Jansson, and Vredin (2002) use
Riksbank forecasts in their analysis, and Huang, Margaritis, and Mayes
(2001) utilize the RBNZ’s published projections. For the United States,
McNees (1986, 1992) uses the Federal Reserve’s internal Green Book
forecasts in estimating a forward-looking reaction function, an
approach that has been adopted by Orphanides (2001) and Boivin
(2003), among others.
18 All three central banks regularly assess their own forecasting perform-
ance: see, for example, McCaw and Ranchhod (2002) for New Zealand,
Pagan (2003) (and the references cited therein) for the Bank of England,
and the “Materials for Assessing Monetary Policy” appendix to the
Riksbank’s March Inflation Report.Kuttner REVIEW
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The policy assumptions underlying the three
central banks’ forecasts also differ on one key dimen-
sion. The Bank of England and Riksbank both report
constant-interest-rate forecasts, in which the interest
rate set by policy is assumed to remain unchanged
over the forecast horizon. Leitemo (2003) has inter-
preted this as a policy rule in which the current
interest rate is set at a level consistent with attaining
the inflation target.19 Vredin (2003) contends that
interpretation is inconsistent with the Riksbank’s
policy; indeed, its Inflation Report has at times
explicitly acknowledged that a significant divergence
between the forecast and the target would require
a change in policy. As discussed below, however, the
Bank of England’s and the Riksbank’s two-year-
ahead forecasts come reasonably close to their stated
targets, at least since 1997. This observation, along
with the well-known instability problems associated
with constant-interest-rate rules, led Vredin (2003)
to question whether these central banks’ forecasts
represent true constant-interest-rate forecasts.20
Unlike other inflation targeters, the RBNZ conditions
its forecasts on the time-varying interest rate given
by the inflation-forecast-based rule used in the staff
macro model.21 In doing so, the RBNZ avoids the
difficult methodological issues associated with
constant-interest-rate projections and provides an
outlook for interest rates and the economy that is
arguably more coherent than those of the other
central banks.
There are also subtle differences in the timing
of the forecasts relative to the policy decisions. The
Riksbank and the RBNZ both publish their forecasts
on the same day on which interest rate decisions
are made. Consequently, these two central banks’
forecasts are conditioned almost by construction
(given the time required to put together a new fore-
cast) on the preceding period’s interest rate. By con-
trast, the Bank of England publishes its inflation
report two weeks after a Monetary Policy Committee
meeting, and as a result its forecasts are conditioned
on the current period’s policy action. Thus, the
Riksbank and RBNZ forecasts can be taken as pre-
determined with respect to the current-period inter-
est rate, while those of the Bank of England cannot.
It is interesting to note that an explicit reaction
function or instrument rule does not figure promi-
nently in any of the three central banks’ official
publications, which tend to focus instead on the
outlook for inflation, relative to its target, and a dis-
cussion of economic conditions more generally.
This is not to say that instrument rules have been
entirely ignored, however. Since 2000, the March
issue of the Riksbank’s Inflation Report has included
an assessment of monetary policy using an econo-
metrically estimated “rule of thumb” based on the
Riksbank’s own inflation forecasts.22 According to
Archer (2003), a Taylor-style rule is used internally
at the RBNZ for assessing various policy options,
and one (the May 2001) issue of the Monetary Policy
Statement actually included such a rule-based
assessment. Nikolov (2002) reports that Bank of
England staff and the Monetary Policy Committee
periodically review the implications of a variety of
policy rules, although the output gap data used to
implement these rules are not made public.
For comparison, we also include an analysis of
Federal Reserve behavior based on the internal fore-
casts contained in the unpublished “Green Books,”
which are made public after a five-year lag.23 This
comparison is inexact at best, however, because
the policy assumptions underlying the Green Book
forecasts differ fundamentally from those embodied
in the inflation targeters’ forecasts. In particular,
while some plausible path for the funds rate target
is assumed in the Green Book, this policy does not
necessarily correspond to the FOMC’s intentions;
nor is it generally the case over the period analyzed
that the policy brings inflation back to a fixed target
by the end of the forecast horizon.24
22 The research underlying the rule of thumb described in the Inflation
Report can be found in Jansson and Vredin (2003) and Berg, Jansson,
and Vredin (2002).
23 Pre-1997 Green Book data can be found at
www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/greenbookdatasets.html.
24 The baseline assumption is typically (though not always) a constant
nominal funds rate; see Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997).
Another possibility would be to use the biannually published “central
tendency” forecast of the FOMC. Although this may conform to the
FOMC’s intentions more closely than the Green Book forecasts, the
conditioning assumptions (inflation objective, interest rate path) are
no clearer.
19 Leitemo (2003) points out that such a constant-interest-rate rule is
time inconsistent, as the interest rate required to achieve the target
would be expected to change as the horizon advances, and derives a
method for calculating the time-consistent equilibrium under such a
constant interest rate rule.
20 Noting that the Riksbank’s two-year inflation forecast, since 1997,
has never fallen outside of the 1 to 3 percent range, Leeper (2003)
also questions the credibility of the Riksbank’s constant-interest-rate
assumption.
21 Details of the RBNZ’s IFB rule can be found in the appendix to Drew
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Properties of the Inflation Forecasts
We begin by simply examining the properties
of the central banks’ inflation forecasts. Figure 1
displays time series of the medium- and long-run
forecasts, along with the current year-over-year
inflation rate and (except for the United States) the
inflation target. The figure reveals considerable
variation in the relatively short-run three-quarter-
ahead forecasts. Not surprisingly, the eight-quarter-
ahead forecasts tend to fall much closer to the target.
Sweden in the early- to mid-1990s is something of
an exception, however, with even the two-year-ahead
forecasts well above the target until 1996.25 The Fed’s
forecast, shown in the lower right-hand panel, also
exhibits a great deal of variation, which reached 5
percent in 1989 before falling to less than 2 percent
with the disinflation that accompanied the 1991-92
recession.26
Another way to look at the same set of data is
to plot the forecast change in the inflation rate against
the deviation of current inflation from its target.
Forecasts that implied a return to the target within
the specified horizon would fall along a –45 degree
line; for example, inflation 1 percent above target
would imply a –1 percent forecast change. The eight-
quarter-ahead forecasts for the RBNZ fall reasonably
close to this –45 degree line, as shown in the upper
left-hand panel of Figure 2. For the United Kingdom,
26 The Green Book’s forecast horizon over the 1986-96 period varied
between five and nine quarters, which is somewhat shorter than that
of the inflation targeters. A seven-quarter-ahead horizon was therefore
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25 According to Berg, Jansson, and Vredin (2002), this early stage of IT
was one in which the Riksbank was still struggling to establish the
credibility of its target.
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the eight-quarter-ahead forecasts (depicted in the
lower left-hand panel) lie very close to the –45 degree
line, which is perhaps to be expected given the way
in which the Bank of England’s forecasts incorporate
recent policy actions. The Riksbank’s forecasts in
the upper right-hand panel are considerably more
spread out, in part reflecting the experience in the
mid-1990s when inflation was above its target and
expected to rise still further. For all three inflation
targeters, the three-quarter-ahead forecast inflation
changes generally lie some distance from the –45
degree line, suggesting that most deviations from the
inflation target are not expected to be fully reversed
at such a short horizon. 
The Fed’s inflation forecasts, shown in the lower
right-hand panel, display an interesting pattern.
Prior to December 1990, the long-horizon Green
Book forecasts tended to revert to a “target” of
approximately 4.5 percent, depicted by the higher
of the two –45 degree lines. (As noted above, this
“target” reflects the assumptions implicit in the
Green Book, rather than the intentions of the FOMC.)
But as inflation fell during the course of the reces-
sion, the implicit “target” in the Green Book seems
to have shifted down to roughly 2.75 percent.
Instrument Rules: Two Conventional
Specifications
This section presents estimates of conventional
instrument rules for the four central banks under
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the classic Taylor (1993) rule, giving the policy rate
as a function of the current output gap and inflation
deviation,
(4)      it=(1 – ρ)i*+β xt,t+γ(πt – π*)+ρ it–1+et,
where xt,t is the current estimate of the current out-
put gap, πt is the current four-quarter inflation rate,
π* is the target inflation rate, and i* is the steady-
state nominal rate of interest (i.e., the inflation target
plus the equilibrium real rate of interest). The only
addition to the canonical Taylor specification is the
lagged interest rate term, whose conventional inter-
pretation is in terms of interest rate “smoothing”—
the partial adjustment of the policy instrument
toward some underlying target rate. In this parame-
terization, the long-run response of the nominal
rate to inflation is γ/(1– ρ).
This is the point at which empirical research
on policy rules must confront the uncomfortable
fact that no central bank, except the RBNZ, consis-
tently reports an estimate of the output gap, xt,t .27
As a practical matter, this obviously complicates
any effort to model central bank behavior in terms
of a policy rule involving the output gap.
Rather than abandon the task at this point, we
proceed by constructing a proxy for the output gap.
Our approach is to back out an implicit estimate of
the output gap using the central banks’ projections
of real GDP growth. Two assumptions are needed
to make this work: (i) an estimate of the growth rate
of potential output and (ii) a terminal condition, i.e.,
the value of the output gap at the end of the forecast
horizon. For (i), we make an educated guess as to
the assumed growth rate of potential output, using
information gleaned from published central bank
sources. For (ii), we assume the output gap reverts
to zero at the end of the forecast horizon, unless
published information suggests otherwise. With
these assumptions, a real-time estimate of the output
gap can be constructed as the accumulated differ-
ence between the forecasts of real GDP growth and
the assumed potential growth rate. Further details
on the construction of the output gap proxy can be
found in the appendix. 
The results, shown in Table 1, suggest a simple
rule like (4) is a poor description of policy for all
27 The RBNZ reported quarterly output gap projections in its Monetary
Policy Statements from December 1997 through November 1999 and
again from December 2000 through March 2001. Annual averages
have been published consistently throughout the 1997-2003 period.
Estimates of the Taylor Specification of the Instrument Rule
Dependent variable = policy interest rate, i
LM test for
Coefficient on 2nd order
auto-
N Intercept Output gap Inflation Lagged i Adjusted R
2 correlation
New Zealand 23 1.14 0.25 –0.04 0.83*** 0.64 12.6
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.78) (0.17) (0.23) (0.13) 0.001
Sweden 38 0.17 –0.63*** 0.27*** 0.99*** 0.96 8.43
1994:Q1–2003:Q2 (0.17) (0.13) (0.05) (0.04) 0.014
United Kingdom 23 –0.79 –0.43* 0.27 1.12*** 0.90 3.25
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.61) (0.22) (0.28) (0.11) 0.197
United States 40 0.68*** 0.32*** 0.10 0.81*** 0.95 7.06
1987:Q1–1996:Q4 (0.33) (0.08) (0.14) (0.07) 0.029
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. The LM test statistic for second-order autocorrelation is N times the R
2 from a regression of the
residual onto all the regressors from the original regression and two lags of the residual. The p value from the χ
2 distribution is reported
underneath the test statistic. For Sweden and the United Kingdom, the policy rate corresponds to the repo rate. For New Zealand, it
is the 90-day bank rate, and for the United States, it is the federal funds rate. For New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the inflation
rate used in the regression is the current-quarter “forecast” of four-quarter inflation. For Sweden, it is the four-quarter percentage
change in the CPI. For the United States, it is the four-quarter percentage change in the CPI, excluding food and energy. Proxies for
the output gap are constructed by accumulating the difference between the forecast growth rates of real GDP and an assumed rate




four central banks. For New Zealand, the coefficient
on inflation is effectively zero, and none of the
coefficients (except that on the lagged interest rate)
is statistically significant. The results are slightly
better for Sweden, which at least exhibits a statisti-
cally significant and positive response to inflation.
The coefficient on the output gap has the wrong
(negative) sign, however, and it is statistically signifi-
cant. The results are also unsatisfactory for the United
Kingdom. Like Sweden, the output gap coefficient is
significant, but has the wrong sign. The inflation
coefficient has the right sign, but it is statistically
insignificant.28 In the United States, we find a signifi-
cant, positive coefficient on the output gap, but the
coefficient on inflation is small and insignificant.
The estimated ρ parameter on the lagged interest
rate is large and highly significant in all cases, rang-
ing from 0.81 for the United States to 1.12 for the
United Kingdom, suggesting an implausibly high
degree of interest rate smoothing. The R
2 are high—
but only because of the explanatory power of the
lagged interest rate.
An alternative to Taylor’s specification, in the
spirit of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), is to use
forecasts of inflation and the output gap, or alter-
natively the current output gap estimate and the
real GDP forecast,
(5)            it=(1 – ρ)i*+β1 xt,t+β2 ∆yt+k,t
+γ(πt+k,t – π*)+ρ it–1+et,
where ∆yt+k,t and πt+k,t are the central bank’s fore-
casts of real GDP growth and inflation over the sub-
sequent k quarters. This specification is attractive,
as it captures rational, forward-looking behavior on
the part of the central bank. In addition, by explicitly
including a forecast of inflation, the coefficients on
the output terms are readily interpreted in terms of
an output stabilization objective. By contrast, the
output gap may appear in the Taylor specification
as a predictor of inflation and may not imply a
weight on output stabilization per se.
Results from estimating (5) appear in Table 2,
with the horizon k set to four quarters. The results
are generally somewhat better than for the backward-
looking Taylor specification. The equation works very
well for New Zealand, in the sense that the coeffi-
cients on the current gap, the growth forecast, and
expected inflation are all significant and have the
expected signs. It also works reasonably well for
Sweden, where the parameter estimates on output
Estimates of the Forward-Looking Instrument Rule
Dependent variable = policy interest rate, i
Coefficient on LM test for
2nd order
Current Growth Inflation auto-
N Intercept output gap forecast forecast Lagged i Adjusted R
2 correlation
New Zealand 23 1.20 0.42** 0.50* 1.22** 0.75*** 0.78 9.00
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.61) (0.19) (0.26) (0.53) (0.10) 0.011
Sweden 38 0.06 –0.18 0.31** 0.65*** 0.77*** 0.97 3.95
1994:Q1–2003:Q2 (0.41) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) 0.138
United Kingdom 23 –2.34 –0.06 0.53 0.09 1.19*** 0.90 4.68
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (1.39) (0.32) (0.39) (0.37) (0.13) 0.096
United States 40 –0.62 0.39*** 0.20 0.50*** 0.70*** 0.96 4.61
1987:Q1–1996:Q4 (0.52) (0.08) (0.17) (0.15) (0.06) 0.100
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. For New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, the inflation forecast is the forecast change in
the target inflation rate over the subsequent four quarters, minus the inflation target (or the midpoint of the range, in the case of
New Zealand). For the United States, it is simply the forecast percentage change in the CPI over the subsequent four quarters, so the
regression intercept also includes any implicit inflation target. The growth forecast is for real GDP growth over the subsequent four
quarters, or in the case of New Zealand, the change in the output gap. See also notes to Table 1.
Table 2
28 One reason for the poor results could be the lack of any significant
variation in inflation or the output gap since 1997. Ironically, the
success of the Bank of England’s IT policy seems to have made it
more difficult to estimate a policy rule.
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growth and year-ahead inflation are both highly
significant.29 The United Kingdom still yields poor
results, however. None of the coefficients is signifi-
cant, although the coefficients on forecast GDP
growth and inflation at least have the correct signs.
For the United States, the output gap and the infla-
tion forecast both have the correct signs and are
significant; in fact, the estimates look a lot like those
reported in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000). The
Taylor principle seems to be satisfied for all but the
United Kingdom. Interestingly, the implied long-run
response of the interest rate to inflation is much
larger for New Zealand and Sweden (4.88 and 2.82,
respectively) than for the United States (1.34). But
this may reflect a difference in the nature of the
Green Book forecast which, unlike the inflation
targeters’, has not assumed a reversion of inflation
toward an unchanged target. The estimated coeffi-
cients on the lagged interest rates are still quite large,
ranging from 0.70 for the United States to 1.19 for
the United Kingdom. 
Instrument Rules: A “Reaction to News”
Specification
One of the consistently unsatisfying results
from conventional instrument rule estimates, like
those presented above, is that the large estimates
of ρ imply an extremely high degree of interest rate
smoothing. Rudebusch (2002) argues that this reflects
the omission of highly serially correlated variables
from the instrument rule, rather than interest rate
smoothing per se.
In a similar vein, Svensson (2003) shows that
the optimal instrument rule for an inflation forecast
targeter has the form
(6)        it=(1 – ρ)i*+β xt+k,t+γ(πt+k,t – π*)
+φ zt+k,t+et,
where zt+k,t is the central bank’s forecast of some
appropriate “judgmental” adjustment term, which
represents an omitted variable in the conventional
instrument rule specification.30 Indeed, as discussed
above in section 2, it is the presence of these unob-
served judgment terms that leads Svensson to argue
for the superiority of formulating policy on the basis
of targeting rules. Omitted, serially correlated judg-
ment terms could, therefore, lead to a spuriously
high degree of measured interest rate smoothing.
Our solution to this issue is a novel approach
to estimating an instrument rule that, in principle,
eliminates the serial correlation in the omitted
judgment term and allows for a clearer distinction
between interest rate smoothing and reaction to
this omitted variable. The innovation is to examine
the response of the policy rate to the “news” con-
tained in the revisions in expectations embodied in
the central banks’ inflation and output forecasts.
This approach is derived quite simply by first
adding a lagged interest rate term to the instrument
rule (6), 
(7)          it=(1 – ρ)i*+β xt+k,t+γ(πt+k,t – π*)
+φ zt+k,t+ρ it–1+et,
and projecting it onto information available to the
central bank at time t–1,
(8)     it,t–1=(1 – ρ)i*+β xt+k,t–1+γ(πt+k,t–1 – π*)
+φ zt+k,t–1+ρ it–1+et,t–1.
Subtracting (8) from (7) gives
(9)  it – it,t–1=β (xt+k,t – xt+k,t–1) + γ(πt+k,t – πt+k,t–1)  
+φ(zt+k,t – zt+k,t–1)+et – et,t–1.
Thus, the difference between the current policy
setting, it, and the expected policy setting as of the
previous period, it,t–1, depends entirely on the revi-
sions in the k-period-ahead expectations of the out-
put gap, inflation, and the unobserved z. Taking the
difference relative to the previous period’s expecta-
tion makes the interest rate smoothing term, ρit–1,
disappear. More importantly, if the central bank’s
forecasts are rational, then the unobserved revision
in the expectation of z should, by the law of iterated
projections, be unforecastable—and consequently
serially uncorrelated. Similarly, any residual serial
correlation in the et term will also disappear, leaving
a specification free from the usual econometric
problems that normally afflict estimated instrument
rules.31
Access to published central bank forecasts makes
it quite easy to implement this approach. Because
of the overlapping nature of these forecasts, the
31 While this specification resembles that of English, Nelson, and Sack
(2002), what distinguishes our approach is its emphasis on forecast
revisions.
29 Very similar results are reported in Berg, Jansson, and Vredin (2002),
who also find that the forecast of output growth is significant.
30 Svensson’s equation actually contains separate terms involving linear
combinations of one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of z, interpreted




revisions in expectations are calculated quite simply
as the difference between the current quarter’s k-
period-ahead forecast and the previous quarter’s
k+1-period-ahead forecast. This approach also
ameliorates the problem with the unobserved out-
put gap. The output gap forecast can be written as
the difference between a forecast of real GDP and a
forecast for potential output—or, equivalently, the
difference between accumulated real GDP growth
and potential growth forecasts. If one is willing to
ignore quarterly revisions in potential growth fore-
casts on the grounds that these are likely to be small
relative to the forecast revisions in output growth,
then the accumulation of the revisions to real GDP
growth forecasts can be substituted for the output
gap forecast revisions.
The only remaining issue is what to use for it,t–1,
the previous period’s forecast of the current interest
rate. For the RBNZ, the solution is quite simple, as
the interest rate projections underlying the inflation
projections are published. In this case, it,t–1 is just
data. The solution is also straightforward for the
Riksbank and the Bank of England. If these banks’
stated policies of maintaining a constant interest rate
over the forecast horizon were accurate (and credi-
ble), then it,t–1 would simply equal it–1, leaving 
(10)    ∆it=β (xt+k,t – xt+k,t–1)+γ(πt+k,t – πt+k,t–1) 
+φ (zt+k,t – zt+k,t–1)+et – et,t–1,
i.e., the change in the policy rate as a function of
“news” about inflation and the output gap. The
resemblance to Hall’s (1978) formulation of the
permanent income hypothesis is not coincidental.
Like a rational consumer, a central bank formulating
policy on the basis of efficient forecasts of its target
variables should satisfy an analogous set of orthog-
onality conditions. As a result, the central bank
should respond only to the news embodied in its
forecast revisions, and not to information that was
already known at time t–1.
For the reasons discussed above, however, the
assumption of a constant interest rate is not realistic,
even for those central banks nominally adhering to
a constant interest rate rule. It is nonetheless possible
to derive a specification similar to (10) for the case
of a time-varying (but unpublished) interest rate path.
To do so requires adding it,t–1 – it–1 to both sides of
(9), so that ∆it appears on the left-hand side; assum-
ing xt+k–1,t–1 ≈ xt+k,t–1 (and likewise for π and z), the
it,t–1 – it–1 on the right-hand side becomes ρ ∆it–1 –
et–1+et,t–1. With this modification, equation (9)
becomes
(11)     ∆it=β (xt+k,t – xt+k,t–1)+γ(πt+k,t – πt+k,t–1)
+φ (zt+k,t – zt+k,t–1)+ ρ ∆it–1+et – et,t–1,
the main difference from (10) being the reappearance
of the interest rate smoothing term, ρ ∆it–1.
Table 3 reports the standard deviation of the
forecast revisions and the change in the policy rate.
Inflation forecast revisions are very similar in
magnitude across the four central banks. Output
growth forecasts are somewhat more volatile for
New Zealand, which may explain the relatively high
degree of variability in that country’s short-term
interest rate. The United Kingdom’s interest rate, on
the other hand, is considerably less volatile, despite
Volatility of Forecast Revisions and Interest Rate Changes
Standard deviation of
Four-quarter-ahead Four-quarter-ahead  Quarterly  change 
real GDP forecast revision inflation forecast revision in policy rate
New Zealand, 1997:Q4–2003:Q2 0.58 0.30 0.78
Sweden, 1994:Q1–2003:Q2 0.34 0.32 0.48
United Kingdom, 1997:Q4–2003:Q2 0.35 0.31 0.40
United States, 1987:Q1–1996:Q4 0.41 0.28 0.53
NOTE: The forecast revisions represent the difference between the four-quarter-ahead forecast made in quarter t and the five-quarter-
ahead forecast made in quarter t–1. The real GDP and inflation forecasts are both for four-quarter growth rates. For New Zealand,
the figure reported for the policy rate is the standard deviation of the policy rate forecast error, it – it,t–1. The standard deviation of
the raw change in the policy rate, ∆it, is 0.80.
Table 3
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having output and inflation forecast revisions com-
parable to those of Sweden.
The regression results appear in Table 4, with
and without the lagged interest rate. As in the con-
ventional forward-looking reaction function esti-
mates above, the horizon k is set to four quarters.
This specification works very well for New Zealand,
with a highly significant response to inflation news
and a positive (but not quite significant) response to
GDP news. In addition, the specification eliminates
the serial correlation in the residuals, with an LM
test statistic for second-order serial correlation of
only 1.06. (The lagged interest rate revision is only
marginally significant when it is included, although
the residuals appear more highly serially correlated
in this case.) The specification also works well for
Sweden, with a significant, positive response to both
output and inflation news; unlike New Zealand, the
coefficient on the lagged interest rate term remains
quite large, even in this specification. Moving to the
“reaction to news” specification greatly improves
the U.K. estimates: the coefficients on output and
inflation news have the right sign, the magnitudes
are plausible, and (depending on the specification)
the responses are statistically significant. The coef-
ficient on the lagged interest rate is much smaller
(less than 0.5, rather than above 1.0), and there is
no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals.
The specification works least well for the United
States, where only the inflation coefficient is even
marginally significant and the United States R
2 is low.
One successful aspect of the “reaction to news”
specification is the large reduction in the coefficient
on the lagged interest rate for the Bank of England,
the RBNZ, and the Fed. This result supports
Rudebusch’s (2002) contention that at least some
of the serial correlation in conventionally specified
instrument rules represents a response to an omitted
variable, rather than interest rate smoothing per se.
Indeed, for the United States the estimated lag coef-
ficient of 0.43 is very close to the 0.4 Rudebusch
obtains from term structure estimates of funds rate
Estimates of the “Reaction to News” Specification of the Instrument Rule
Dependent variable = change in policy rate: ∆it, or it – it,t–1 for New Zealand
LM test for 
Coefficient on 2nd order 
auto- 
N Output news Inflation news ∆it–1 or it–1 – it–1,t–2 Adjusted R
2 correlation
New Zealand 21 0.36 1.45*** — 0.39 1.06
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.22) (0.46) 0.303
20 0.26 1.61*** 0.33* 0.49 7.30
(0.22) (0.45) (0.17) 0.026
Sweden 38 0.27 0.47** — 0.09 13.00
1994:Q1–2003:Q2 (0.22) (0.24) 0.002
38 0.37** 0.51*** 0.69*** 0.56 10.00
(0.16) (0.16) (0.11) 0.007
United Kingdom 23 0.39 0.73** — 0.11 7.19
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.26) (0.35) 0.027
22 0.58** 0.52 0.47** 0.32 2.22
(0.24) (0.32) (0.19) 0.330
United States 37 0.02 0.55* — 0.03 13.57
1987:Q1–1996:Q4 (0.21) (0.31) 0.001
37 0.02 0.46 0.43*** 0.23 7.20
(0.19) (0.27) (0.14) 0.027
NOTE: ***/**/* Indicate significance at the 1/5/10 percent levels, respectively. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Numbers in
parentheses are standard errors. The “news” regressors are the central banks’ four-quarter-ahead forecast revisions: e.g., the time-t
forecast of four-quarter GDP growth four quarters ahead, minus the time-t–1 forecast of four-quarter GDP growth five quarters ahead.




predictability, and it implies a much more plausible
level of interest rate smoothing. It is also not far from
the smoothing coefficient of 0.54 reported by
English, Nelson, and Sack (2002) for the forward-
looking specification with real-time data. The
Riksbank is an exception in this regard: The esti-
mated lag coefficient remains a highly significant
0.7 even in the “reaction to news” specification,
perhaps suggesting a larger role for interest rate
smoothing in that case.32
Another attractive feature of this specification
is that it allows us to get a much clearer picture of
the degree of “judgment” in the setting of policy,
relative to a simple instrument rule. An assessment
of the role of judgment was difficult to make in the
conventional specifications, because it was hard to
distinguish between the omitted, serially correlated
z and interest rate smoothing. By contrast, the resid-
ual from equation (10) or (11) has a clearer interpre-
tation in terms of revisions to the relevant judgment
factors. 
The interpretation is particularly clean in the
case of New Zealand, where the non-constant
interest rate assumption and the availability of data
on it,t–1 mean the results are not muddled by the
implausibility of the constant interest rate assump-
tion. In this case, the respectable but still relatively
low R
2 (0.39 without the lagged interest rate, 0.49
with the lagged rate) means no more than one-half
of the variance in the interest rate can be traced
directly to revisions in the output and inflation fore-
casts. Thus, even the (arguably) most rule oriented
of all the IT central banks apparently still exercises
a great deal of judgment in setting policy.
What About Optimal Targeting Rules?
An alternative way to describe central banks’
behavior is in terms of a targeting rule, as opposed
to the instrument rules considered in the preceding
section. As stressed by Svensson (2003), this formu-
lation has the advantage of being immune to the
inclusion of judgment terms in the central bank’s
forecast, and in the size of the policy action needed
to attain its target. While setting policy to achieve
an inflation target at a given horizon might be con-
sidered one form of an ad hoc targeting rule, the
question taken up in this section is whether inflation
targeters’ behavior can be characterized in terms of
simple optimal targeting rules.
With a backward-looking inflation process in
which the inflation rate at time t+1 depends on the
current output gap, xt , the specific targeting rule
can be written as 
(12) πt+τ,t – π*=(λ/αx) (xt+τ,t – xt+τ–1,t),
i.e., as a linear relationship between the forecast
inflation gap in period t+τ and the forecast change
in the output gap between periods t+τ – 1 and
t+τ.33 (Note that here, the period corresponds to
the length of time it takes for a change in the output
gap to affect inflation, rather than a calendar quarter.)
The constant of proportionality is the ratio of λ, the
weight on output in the loss function, to αx, which
is effectively the slope of the aggregate supply rela-
tion (i.e., ∂πt+1/∂πt). 
The intuition behind this condition is straight-
forward and can be put in terms of marginal costs
and benefits. Take the case of τ=2, 
(13) πt+2,t – π*=(λ/αx) (xt+2,t – xt+1,t),
for example. Suppose inflation in period t+2 were
forecast to come in above its target, π*. With a quad-
ratic loss function, the marginal benefit of reducing
inflation is simply equal to the gap between inflation
and its target. With a backward-looking inflation
process and a one-period lag in the response of
inflation, reducing inflation in period t+2 requires
running a negative output gap at time t+1, relative
to the future gap. In terms of output, the cost of
reducing inflation is proportional to 1/αx; this
increases the loss function by an amount λ/αx. At the
optimum, the marginal benefit in terms of inflation
reduction is equated to the marginal cost of foregone
output.34
The bottom line is that under the assumption
of a backward-looking inflation process, optimal
monetary policy should induce a positive correlation
between the forecast inflation gap and the forecast
change in the output gap. This is not true if the
inflation process is assumed to be forward-looking,
however. In this case, the relevant targeting rule is
(14)        πt+τ,t – π*=–(λ/αx) (xt+τ,t – xt+τ–1,t),
and optimal policy induces a negative correlation
33 See Svensson (2003, equation 5.13). Note that this reflects the approxi-
mation that the discount factor, δ, is close to unity.
34 This explanation is admittedly somewhat heuristic. See Svensson (2003)
for a more precise (but arguably less intuitive) explanation in terms
of the relevant marginal rates of substitution and transformation.
32 The estimate of ρ shrinks if the sample is started in 1997, however,
suggesting that some of the apparent “smoothing” may be associated
with the dramatic decline in interest rates in 1996.
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between the forecast inflation gap and the forecast
change in the output gap. 
Indeed, the only difference between this rule
and the one for the backward-looking inflation
process is the negative sign multiplying the change
in the output gap. Although it may seem odd that a
simple alteration to the assumed behavior of inflation
should change the sign of the relationship describ-
ing optimal monetary policy, the intuition is straight-
forward. In the forward-looking inflation model,
inflation in period t+2 responds contemporaneously
to the period-t expectation of the output gap in
period t+2. Thus, faced with greater-than-desired
inflation in period t+2, policy will tighten, inducing
a negative output gap (relative to the previous period)
in that period in order to bring inflation down. 
This particular specific targeting rule corresponds
to one derived under pre-commitment, or a “time-
less” perspective. Under discretion, the targeting
rule would look like
(15) πt+τ,t – π*=–(λ/αx) xt+τ,t,
and not exhibit the “history dependence” that is a
hallmark of the pre-commitment solution. In this
case, optimal policy induces a negative correlation
between the forecast inflation gap and the forecast
output gap itself, rather than its change.
The lack of a clear implication for even the sign
of the relationship between inflation and output
gap forecasts means it is hard to put any of these
targeting rules to the test empirically—after all,
either a positive or a negative correlation could be
interpreted as evidence that the central bank was
obeying a specific targeting rule of some sort. By
contrast, the signs of the coefficients in the optimal
instrument rules do not depend on the assumed
nature of the inflation process, although the mag-
nitudes do depend on this assumption. In any case,
any Phillips curve fit to the data would likely contain
both forward- and backward-looking terms, undoubt-
edly making the relevant instrument rules more
involved than those summarized above.
Further complicating matters is the question of
where to put the error term in a regression used to
estimate relationships like (12), (14), or (15) and
what that error term actually means. After all, these
targeting rules should hold exactly in terms of the
central banks’ forecasts, assuming those forecasts
embody the assumption that policy behaves opti-
mally; any judgment should already be incorporated
into the central banks’ forecasts. (In the context of
estimating an instrument rule, the vice of judgment
terms becomes a virtue, in that it at least suggests a
plausible rationale for an error term in the regres-
sion.) One potential source of error is mismeasure-
ment of the forecast output gap, which, as described
above, can generally only be inferred (imperfectly)
from central banks’ published GDP forecasts. An-
other potential source is that central banks behave
suboptimally—although in this case it is not clear
whether the error term from any less-than-optimal
policy should be thought of as orthogonal to the
inflation or the output gap forecasts (if either).
Our crude but effective solution to this normal-
ization problem is to report the correlation coeffi-
cients, rather than the estimated slope coefficients
from regressions. The benefit of this approach is
that the correlation coefficient does not depend on
the normalization; the cost, of course, is that it says
nothing directly about the size of the parameter of
interest, λ/αx. But at least the correlation can say
something about the “closeness” of the empirical
relationship implied by the targeting rule; and, given
that even the sign of the relationship is up for grabs,
this seems like a reasonable compromise.
Table 5 reports the correlations relevant to the
three targeting rules discussed above. The first two
are those between the forecast inflation gap and the
forecast change in the output gap pertaining to the
backward-looking inflation process and the forward-
looking inflation process under pre-commitment,
for the four- and eight-quarter-ahead horizons. Also
reported are those between the forecast inflation
and output gaps pertaining to the forward-looking,
discretionary case.
In a few cases, there is a significant, negative
relationship between forecasts of the inflation gap
and forecasts of the change in the output gap, con-
sistent with optimal monetary policy with a forward-
looking inflation process. For New Zealand, there is
a correlation of –0.46 at the four- to eight-quarter
horizon; for the United Kingdom, a negative corre-
lation of a similar magnitude is observed at the
shorter zero- to four-quarter horizon. The correla-
tions are relatively weak and insignificant in the
case of Sweden.
The correlation is a surprisingly strong –0.69
for the United States at the four- to eight-quarter
horizon. Interestingly, this is almost entirely the
result of the early 1990s’ disinflation, when the
Green Book contained forecasts for above-average
(but falling) inflation along with a widening output
gap—a period typically thought of more in terms of
serendipitous “opportunistic disinflation” than as
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an expression of forward-looking optimal monetary
policy. In interpreting this result, it is important to
keep in mind that the correlation is calculated assum-
ing a constant mean, which implies an unchanged
inflation target. Consequently, the negative correla-
tion may reflect the downward shift in the Fed’s
inflation target that coincided with the 1991-92
recession.
The results are less supportive of the forward-
looking, discretionary specification involving the
level of the output gap forecasts. The correlation is
insignificant for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
the United States. Only for New Zealand is the cor-
relation significant, but in this case it has the “wrong”
(i.e., positive) sign.
Overall, the results of this exercise lend luke-
warm support for describing inflation targeters’
(and the Federal Reserve’s) monetary policy in terms
of a simple targeting rule, with an underlying for-
ward-looking view of the inflation process. Still,
with estimated correlation coefficients generally in
the –0.3 to –0.5 range (corresponding to values for
the R
2, 0.09 to 0.25), the goodness of fit is mediocre
at best and somewhat worse than that of typical
estimated instrument rules. It is also important to
bear in mind that uncovering a negative correlation
between inflation and output forecasts does not
necessarily imply that policymakers were behaving
optimally. Such a correlation could conceivably
arise even with policy governed by a suboptimal or
ad hoc rule (or none at all). Furthermore, the simple
targeting rules considered here will be misspecified
if the underlying inflation process contains both
backward- and forward-looking elements. Extending
the exercise to more realistic models, along the lines
of Giannoni and Woodford (2003c), is clearly
worthwhile—although it is also worth noting that,
as the targeting rule becomes more complex, it
becomes less useful as a means of communicating
the policy trade-offs to the public.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The overall goal of this paper has been to bridge
the gap between the literature describing the prac-
tice of IT and the literature on monetary policy rules.
In an effort to dispel some of the terminological
confusion that has contributed to this gap, section 2
reviewed some of the alternative definitions of the
term “policy rule,” while section 3 proposed various
ways of interpreting IT within the context of these
rules.
Ultimately, the question of how IT shapes
monetary policy is an empirical one, however. And
here, the empirical results of section 4 suggest a
number of important conclusions. The first is that
simple instrument rules do provide a reasonable
approximation to the conduct of monetary policy,
both by inflation targeters and by the Federal Reserve.
Second, instrument rules based on forecasts of infla-
tion and output perform better than those based
Output-Inflation Correlations Corresponding to Targeting Rules
Correlations between
(πt+k,t – π*), (xt+k,t – xt+k–4,t)( πt+k,t – π*), (xt+k,t)
k = 4 k = 8 k = 4
New Zealand –0.054 –0.455 0.415
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.81) (0.03) (0.04)
Sweden –0.181 –0.144 0.082
1994:Q1–2003:Q2 (0.27) (0.42) (0.62)
United Kingdom –0.419 0.303 0.325
1997:Q4–2003:Q2 (0.05) (0.16) (0.12)
United States –0.383 –0.689 –0.263
1987:Q1–1996:Q4 (0.02) (0.00) (0.21)
NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are p values for the hypothesis that the correlation is zero, assuming ρ ˆ(N – 2)
1/2/(1–ρ ˆ
2)
1/2 follows a t
distribution with N – 2 degrees of freedom, where N is the number of observations. Because the output gap estimates often rely on
the assumption that the eight-quarter-ahead gap is zero, the correlation between the inflation and output gap at this horizon is not
reported.
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only on current output and inflation. Third, while
inflation targeters tend to exhibit a somewhat larger
response to inflation forecasts than the Federal
Reserve, inflation targeters are not “inflation nutters.”
Although the results depend somewhat on the speci-
fication used, forecasts of the output gap or GDP
growth do seem to influence interest rate decisions,
even controlling for the inflation outlook. 
But these conventional instrument rules also
leave a great deal unexplained (or at least “explained”
only by the lagged interest rate). This observation
suggests a fourth conclusion, namely, that central
banks exercise a great deal of judgment or discretion
relative to these rules. Estimates of an instrument
rule from a novel “reaction to news” specification
indicate that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
probably comes closest to a pure inflation forecast
targeter; but even then, less than half of the variance
from the planned interest rate path can be traced
to forecast revisions.
A fifth conclusion is that simple optimal target-
ing rules of the kind advocated by Svensson (2003)
do not provide a particularly good description of the
conduct of monetary policy for any of the central
banks considered. Fitting optimal targeting rules to
the data, however, is complicated by the fact that
central banks generally do not report output gaps,
much less forecasts of those gaps; moreover, theory
alone provides no clear guide as to the correct sign
of the correlation implied by targeting rules.
At the level of estimated targeting or instrument
rules, it is hard to draw sharp distinctions between
the behavior of the three bona fide inflation targeters
studied and that of the Federal Reserve. But, in
general, the connection between changes in the
short-term interest rate and forecast revisions is
looser for the Fed than for the full-fledged inflation
targeters. A sixth conclusion that could be drawn
from the results, therefore, is that the FOMC uses
even more judgment than the (significant) amount
exercised by the inflation targeters.
While they may disappoint those who view IT
purely in terms of a policy rule, these conclusions
will come as no surprise to those familiar with 
the practice of IT, as described, for example, by
Heikensten and Vredin (2002). At the same time,
the lack of a sharp, qualitative difference between
the Fed’s behavior and that of the inflation targeters
will probably do little to alter the priors of skeptics,
such as Ball and Sheridan (2003), who contend the
policy makes little practical difference.35
A hypothesis left unexplored in this paper is
that the real impact of IT is not so much on central
bank policymaking, per se, as it is on the impact of
those policy decisions upon inflation expectations
in the markets and the broader public; that is, that
talk does matter after all. This interpretation of IT
suggests that the response of expectations to econ-
omic news, or to policy itself, should be more
“anchored” for inflation targeters than for less-
transparent non-inflation targeters, as suggested in
Kuttner and Posen (1999, 2001) and Levin, Natalucci,
and Piger (2004). If so, then a better place to look
for effects of IT would be in the financial markets,
and particularly in the prices of assets that embody
inflation expectations. Examining financial markets’
response to policy—and, in particular, to “discre-
tionary” policy actions with no apparent connection
to the central banks’ forecasts—may prove inform-
ative as to whether IT can anchor expectations as
its proponents claim. 
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 CONSTRUCTING REAL-TIME OUTPUT
GAP PROXIES
As described in section 4, the method used to
construct estimates of the output gap involves
accumulating the difference between the forecast
real GDP growth rates and some assumed potential
growth rate, imposing a terminal condition on the
output gap at the end of the forecast horizon. This
recursive technique is adapted to the specifics of
each central bank’s forecasts, as described here.
The United Kingdom 
The Bank of England consistently reports four-
quarter real GDP and inflation forecasts at a horizon
of one to eight quarters ahead. Because the individual
quarterly GDP forecasts are not reported, it is not
possible to back-out a quarterly output gap series.
But the four-quarter growth figures can be used to
construct measures of the current gap and the four-
quarter-ahead forecasts. The recursion can be
described as follows:
xt+8=0
xt+k=xt+k+4 – (g – ∆4 yt+k+4) for k=4 and 0,
where xt+k is the k-quarter-ahead output gap, g is
the growth rate of potential output (assumed to be
a constant 2.4 percent per year), and ∆4 yt+k is the
forecast four-quarter real GDP growth rate (based
on the reported mode of the forecast distribution).
Sweden
The Sveriges Riksbank consistently reports a
current-year forecast for inflation and output and
forecasts for the subsequent two “out” years. Because
of this structure, the effective forecast horizon varies
between 8 and 11 quarters. The terminal condition
on the output gap is imposed only on the longest,
the 11-quarter “benchmark” forecast. Letting xs+k,q
represent the output gap in the qth quarter of year
Kuttner REVIEW
110 JULY/AUGUST 2004
Policy.” Journal of Political Economy, February 1936, 44(1),
pp. 1-30.
Sterne, Gabriel.  “Inflation Targets in a Global Context,” in
N. Loayza and R. Soto, eds., Inflation Targeting: Design,
Performance, Challenges. Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of
Chile, 2002.
Stone, Mark R. “Inflation Targeting Lite.” IMF Working
Paper No. 03/12, International Monetary Fund, 2003.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary
Policy Rule.” Journal of Monetary Economics, June 1999,
43(3), pp. 607-54.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “The First Year of the Eurosystem:
Inflation Targeting or Not?” American Economic Review,
May 2000, 90(2), pp. 95-99.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules?
Using Judgment in Monetary Policy Through Targeting
Rules.” Journal of Economic Literature, June 2003, 41(2),
pp. 426-77.
Taylor, John B. “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
December 1993, 39, pp. 195-214.
Taylor, John B. “Recent Developments in the Use of Monetary
Policy Rules,” in C. Joseph and A.H. Gunawan, eds.,
Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting in Emerging
Economies. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia, 2000.
Truman, Edwin M. Inflation Targeting in the World Economy.
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
2003.
Vredin, Anders.  Discussion of  S. Honkapohja and K. Mitra
“Problems in Inflation Targeting Based on Constant
Interest Rate Projections.” Prepared for the conference,
“Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy.” Eltville,
Germany, August 30-31, 2003.
Willams, John C. “Simple Rules for Monetary Policy.”
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,
2003, pp. 1-12.
Woodford, Michael. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a
Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003.
AppendixFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Kuttner
JULY/AUGUST 2004      111
s+k, the gap for the first quarter of each year is
constructed recursively in a manner similar to that
of the Bank of England:
xs+3,1=0
xs+k,1=xs+k+1,1 – (g – ∆ ys+k) for k=2 to 0,
where ∆ ys+k is real GDP growth in year s+k. Subse-
quent quarters’ output gap estimates are constructed
by accumulating over the relevant forecast horizon
the forecast revisions relative to the previous quarter.
Potential growth was assumed to be 2.6 percent
throughout, except in 2000 when it was 2.8 percent
and 2002 and 2003, when values of 2.5 and 2.4
percent were used, respectively. The end-of-forecast-
horizon gap was assumed to be zero, except in 1999,
when the March Inflation Report referred to under-
utilized resources at the end of the forecast period
and in 2000 when the March Inflation Report referred
to capacity restrictions. For these years, the end-of-
forecast-period gaps are assumed to be –1 and 1
percent, respectively.
New Zealand
For 12 of the quarters in the sample, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand reports quarterly estimates
of the output gap. For the remaining 12 quarters,
estimates were constructed using a method similar
to that used for the United Kingdom, based on
reported four-quarter real GDP growth rate forecasts.
The United States
The Federal Reserve is unique in that the Green
Book reports forecasts for quarterly GNP and/or GDP
growth, which allows the quarterly implied path of
the output gap to be extracted. However the forecast
horizon varies between four and nine quarters,
depending on the date at which the forecast was
made. As in Sweden, the terminal condition on the
output gap is imposed only for the long-horizon
(eight- or nine-quarter-ahead) “benchmark” fore-
casts, and the estimated gap is constructed as 
xt+T=0
xt+k=xt+k+1 – (g – ∆ yt+k) for k=T–1 to 0.
The accumulated revisions in the quarterly GDP
growth forecasts are used to update the gap estimates
between “benchmarks.” Forecast data for the first
through fourth quarters are taken from the Green
Books dated January or February, May, August, and
October or November. Prior to January 1992, output
growth is based on real GNP; after this, real GDP is
used.REVIEW
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